We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians vote in favor or against regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their * This paper builds on our earlier project circulated under the title "Guns and Votes."
The model also predicts that election proximity should have no effect on politicians who are retiring or hold safe seats, as they do not face a tradeoff between policy preferences and re-election motives. Moreover, politicians should only flip flop when the single-issue minority is neither too small nor too large.
To assess the evidence, we examine the determinants of U.S. senators' votes on regulations on gun rights, the environment, and reproductive rights. The staggered structure of the U.S. Senate -in which senators serve six-year terms and one third of them is up for re-election every two years -provides a quasi-experimental setting to verify whether election proximity affects the decisions of incumbent politicians. For any given vote, we can compare the behavior of senators who belong to three different "generations," i.e. face elections at different times. 8 We can also study whether election proximity affects the stance of individual senators over time, exploiting the fact that senators cast multiple votes on the same issue during their terms in office.
We have assembled a novel dataset that allows us to link senators' voting behavior on the three policy issues of interest to a wealth of characteristics of the legislators and their constituencies. To identify the relevant votes to be included in the analysis, we by single-issue voters is a widespread phenomenon, which spans other policy issues and other levels of policymaking. Our theoretical model and empirical findings show that electoral incentives are a key determinant of national choices on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. Rather than responding to the median voter, politicians are accountable to different single-issue minorities of voters on different policy issues.
Because they see the policy space as unidimensional, these minorities keep politicians in check and shape their policy choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline our theoretical model. Section 3 presents our main empirical results. The last section concludes. In the Online Appendix, we discuss the related literature in more details (Section A), present the full version of the theoretical model (Section B), and describe the data and variables used in our empirical analysis (Section C, which also includes additional results).
Theoretical Framework
In Section B of the Online Appendix, we develop a simple model of politicians' choices to help structure our empirical analysis. We build on standard probabilistic voting models (e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1982; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1996 , Persson and Tabellini, 2001 , and Stromberg, 2004 . We focus on the decisions of an incumbent, who serves a mandate lasting two periods, with elections taking place at the end of the second period. The incumbent is both policy and office motivated and in each period she is called to vote on three policy issues: gun 10 Bouton, Laurent, Paola Conconi, Francisco Pino, and Maurizio Zanardi, "The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion," Review of Economics and Statistics (2020) . Advance publication. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00897 control regulations, environmental regulations, and regulations on reproductive rights.
As discussed in the introduction, a key feature of these policy issues is their "secondary" nature, i.e. the fact that the majority of the electorate does not care intensely about them. To reflect our empirical analysis, we consider the three issues separately (i.e. in each period, the incumbent votes on one piece of legislation related to each policy issue).
The model delivers three propositions. Proposition 1 characterizes the behavior of an anti-issue incumbent. It shows that election proximity can only have a pro-issue effect on such an incumbent, and that she flip-flops only when the pro-issue minority in her constituency is of intermediate size. Proposition 2 characterizes the behavior of a pro-issue incumbent. It shows that election proximity can only have a anti-issue effect on such an incumbent, and that she flip-flops only when the anti-issue minority in her constituency is of intermediate size. Proposition 3 shows that an incumbent who is not affected by re-election incentives (either because she is retiring or because she holds a safe seat) never flip-flops.
To map these propositions into empirical predictions, we will examine the impact of election proximity on the voting behavior of U.S. senators on regulations concerning gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. As discussed before, the staggered structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and one third is up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of different generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
In terms of voters' preferences, we will work under the following assumptions, justified above: (i) the pro-gun minority is substantially larger than the minority in favor of gun regulations (i.e. gun < 0 in the model) ; (ii) the pro-environment minority is sub-stantially larger than the anti-environment minority (i.e. env > 0); and (iii) there are no substantial size or intensity differences between the pro-life and pro-choice minorities (i.e. repr 0).
We also need a proxy for the policy preferences of incumbents (i.e., ω (s) in the model). To this purpose, we assume that senators' policy preferences reflect their party line: Republican senators are pro gun, opposed to environmental regulations, and pro life, while Democratic senators are pro gun control, pro environment, and pro choice.
As discussed in Section B of the Online Appendix, a large body of literature finds that politicians from the same party tend to vote similarly, either because politicians' with similar preferences select into the same party or because parties use rewards and punishments to influence their members' voting behavior (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1985 and 2007; Krehbiel, 1993; Levitt, 1996; Ansolabehere et al. 2001; McCarty et al., 2001) . These findings suggest that party affiliation can be used as a proxy for senators' policy preferences. The assumption that Republicans are more likely to be pro gun, anti environment and pro life (and conversely for Democrats) is in line with previous studies reviewed in Section A of the Online Appendix on US congressmen's votes on gun regulations (e.g. Langbein and Lotwis, 1990), environmental regulations (e.g. Nelson, 2002) , and reproductive rights (Washington, 2008) . It also finds support in our data on roll-call votes on these issues. 9
Propositions 1 and 2 lead to our first testable prediction: 9 Based on our samples of votes, Republican senators are around 42 percentage points more likely to vote pro-guns, 38 percentage points less likely to vote pro-environment, and 72 percentage points more likely to vote pro-life than Democratic senators.
Prediction 1. Election proximity should increase the likelihood that Democratic senators vote pro-gun and that Republican senators vote pro-environment; it should have no effect on the voting behavior of Democrats and Republicans voting on reproductive rights.
In the model, incumbents flip flop when they face a tradeoff between their policy preferences and their re-election motives. Notice that measurement error in our proxy of incumbents' policy preferences works against us, making it harder to find support for Prediction 1. To see this, take the example of gun control and suppose that some Propositions 1 and 2 highlight the ambiguous effect that the size of the single-issue minority can have on the flip-flopping behavior of incumbents. For example, consider n p , the size of the pro-issue minority. Proposition 1 shows that, when n p is either sufficiently small (condition (ii) is satisfied), or sufficiently large (condition (iii) is satisfied), an antiissue incumbent does not flip flop. In the former case, she always vote against the issue, while, in the latter case, she always vote in favor. It is only when n p is of intermediate size (condition (iii) is satisfied) that the incumbent flip flops. This means that n p has a non-monotonic effect on incumbents' incentives to flip flop. Similarly, Proposition 2 shows that n a , the size of the anti-issue minority, has an ambiguous effect on the flip-flopping behavior of a pro-issue politician. This leads to our last testable prediction: 
Empirical Methodology and Results
To assess the validity of the model's predictions, we have assembled a novel dataset that allows us to link U.S. senators' voting behavior on each policy issue to a wealth of characteristics of the legislators and their constituencies. We describe our data in Section C.1 of the Online Appendix).
We follow two complementary strategies to identify the effect of election proximity on senators' voting behavior. First, we exploit variation in the voting behavior of different senators, depending on which generation they belonged to at the time of the vote.
Second, we exploit changes in the voting behavior of individual senators over time.
The impact of election proximity, party differences
To assess the validity of Prediction 1, we estimate the following linear probability model: and λ 3 should be negative and significant, with λ 3 significantly smaller than λ 2 . Finally, election proximity should have no impact on senators' voting behavior on reproductive rights, because of the presence of intense minorities on both sides of the issue; λ 1 should thus be insignificant, and λ 2 should not be significantly different from λ 3 .
The matrix X it includes additional controls for legislators (e.g. gender, age), and W jt is a matrix of state-specific characteristics (e.g. crime rate, education). In our benchmark specifications, we also include two sets of fixed effects: δ j are state dummies, capturing time-invariant characteristics of constituencies that may affect senators' voting behavior (e.g. rural); δ t are year dummies, which allow us to account for year-specific variables (e.g. share of Democratic senators in Congress). In alternative specifications, we replace the year dummies with vote dummies or add interactions between state and
year dummies. Notice that, when we include these interactions, we identify the effect of election proximity based on differences in the voting behavior of senators from the same state in the same year. This allows us to account for changes in state-level preferences on a given issue due to a local shock (e.g. a shooting rampage).
When we estimate (1), we identify the effect of election proximity exploiting variation in the voting behavior of different senators, depending on which generation they belonged to at the time of the vote. This identification strategy relies on the staggered structure of the Senate. This guarantees that, at any point in time, a third of legislators are close to facing re-election (i.e. whenever a vote is cast in the Senate, a third of members belong to the third generation).
Still, one might be concerned that the timing of the votes could be correlated with characteristics of the senators who belong to the third generation. For example, votes on gun control may always be timed so that some Democratic senators are close to facing re-election. If this is the case, a positive correlation between belonging to the third generation and voting pro gun may be driven by selection effects in the timing of the votes rather than by the impact of election proximity (although the inclusion of year or vote dummies alleviates these concerns, allowing us to control for the composition of the Senate at the time of the vote).
Our second empirical strategy allows us deal with this concern, exploiting variation in the voting behavior of individual senators over time to identify the effect of election proximity. This strategy relies on the fact that senators usually serve for long periods of time and cast several votes on each policy issue while belonging to different generations.
In this case, if the results confirm our model's predictions, they cannot be driven by selection effects in the timing of the votes: if the votes on a particular policy issue were always timed so that some particular senators are close to re-election, we should not find any evidence of flip-flopping when relying only on within-senator variation. 12 12 Further reassurance against the endogeneity of the timing of the votes comes from regressing the number of votes on gun and environmental regulations in a given congress against the number or share of Democratic and Republican senators running for reelection in that congress. The results of these regressions show no significant cross-party differences.
We estimate the following linear probability model:
where δ i are senator dummies. In these regressions, we cluster standard errors at the senator level. The interpretation (and expected signs) of the key variables of interest are the same as for model (1) Tables 1-3 present the results of estimating models (1) and (2) for each of the three policy issues. The specifications in each table differ in terms of the regressors and fixed effects included, or the econometric methodology employed, but all provide strong support for the first prediction of our model. Focusing on the key regressors, we see that the estimated coefficients λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 match the expected sign and significance.
To save on space, in Tables 1-3 we only report the coefficients of our key variables of interest (see Tables 1-3 in Section C.3 of the Online Appendix for a longer version of these tables, which includes the coefficients of the auxiliary controls).
The estimates in Table 1 confirm that Democratic senators are more likely to vote pro gun as they approach re-election (the coefficient of the interaction variable Senate3 it × Democrat it is always positive and significant). By contrast, Republican senators do not change their voting behavior during their terms (the test at the bottom of the table is never significant). These results are in line with our prediction that the presence of a strong minority of gun-rights activists can make Democrats vote against their own preferences when they are close to re-election. 13
[ Table 1 about here]
In terms of magnitude, the effect is very stable across specifications. When comparing across senators, Democrats are between 7.0 and 8.5 percentage points more likely to vote pro gun in the last two years of their mandates. This effect is slightly larger (i.e. around 10 percentage points) when we only exploit variation in the voting behavior of individual senators over time. As expected, Republican senators are significantly more likely to vote pro gun, but their behavior does not change as they get closer to re-election. These results are in line with the first prediction of our model: when it comes to environmental regulations, only Republican senators face a tradeoff between their policy preferences (which lead them to vote against regulations at the beginning of their terms)
and their re-election motives (which lead them to vote in line with the preferences of the green single-issue minority at the end of their terms).
[ Table 2 about here]
The estimates of Table 2 imply that election proximity increases the probability of Republican senators voting pro environment by between 1.7 and to 2.2 percentage points (when comparing across senators) and by between 1.3 and 1.4 percentage points (when exploiting only within-senator variation). 14 When it comes to votes on reproductive rights, the evidence in Table 3 is again very supportive of the first prediction of our theoretical model. In the case of regulations related to reproductive rights, no politician should face a tradeoff between policy preferences and re-election motives, due to the presence of strong pro-choice and pro-life minorities. We would thus expect senators of both parties to vote according to their policy preferences throughout their terms. Indeed, the results in Table 3 show that [ Table 3 about here]
Summing up, the results of Tables 1-3 confirm that election proximity has a progun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators.
As expected, senators' voting behavior on reproductive rights is instead unaffected by election proximity. These results are identified by comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same legislation, as well as the behavior of individual senators voting on different legislations.
In our analysis so far, we have allowed the party affiliation variable to be time varying, given that a few senators in our sample changed from one party to the other (Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Jim Jeffords, Richard Shelby and Arlen Specter), while others switched from one of the parties to being independent (e.g. Joe Lieberman and Bernie Sanders). We have verified that the results of Tables 1-3 continue to hold if we   drop from our sample the senators who switched parties (see Tables C-2 , C-3, and C-4 in the Online Appendix). Compared to our benchmark regression, the main difference is that we can no longer identify differences in parties' stances on gun control, environment and reproductive rights in the specifications that include senator fixed effects (columns 5-7). However, the results confirm the first prediction of our theoretical model: only
Democratic senators flip flop on gun control, becoming more pro gun as they approach re-election; only Republican senators flip flop on the environment, becoming "greener"
as they approach re-election; and election proximity does not affect votes on reproductive rights by senators from either party.
Re-election motives
Having found strong support for the first prediction of our model, we now assess the validity of the second and third predictions. These can be seen as placebo tests for the idea that re-election motives -and the contrast with policy preferences -are the reason why some politicians flip-flop.
We first use variation in the voting behavior of retiring vs. non-retiring senators to verify whether re-election motives are the reason behind the flip-flopping documented in 
The variable Retiring it takes the value of 1 for senators stepping down for exogenous reasons (see the Online Appendix for details). Our theoretical model suggests that λ 1 should be positive and significant, as Democratic (Republican) senators seeking re-election should become more pro gun (environment), while λ 2 should not be significantly different from λ 3 . the coefficient on the interaction term Senate3 it × Not Retiring it is always positive and significant and indicates that Democratic senators seeking re-election are between 8 and 12 percentage points more likely to vote pro-gun at the end of their terms.
[ Table 4 about here]
Moving to the behavior of Republican senators on environmental policy, the results of Table 5 show that only senators seeking re-election become "greener" at the end of their terms: the coefficient of the interaction term Senate3 it × Not Retiring it indicates that non-retiring senators are around 3 percentage points more likely to vote pro environment when they approach re-election. By contrast, retiring senators do not change their voting behavior during their terms (see the test at the bottom of the table).
[ Table 5 about here]
The results of Tables 4 and 5 (larger), they should always vote anti gun (pro gun). We would then expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability that a Democratic senator flip flops and per capita subscriptions to gun magazines in his or her state. To verify this, we restrict again our sample to Democratic senators and interact the variable Senate3 it with Gun magazine subscriptions jt and its square term. Our theory suggests that the estimate for the linear term should be positive, while the square term should have a negative sign.
The results reported in Table 8 strongly support the fourth prediction of our model:
the coefficient for the linear term is positive and significant, while the coefficient for the square term is negative and significant. The test at the bottom of the table indicates that Senate3 it and the two interaction terms are jointly significant at 5%.
[ Table 8 about here] We next examine whether the impact of election proximity on Republicans' voting behavior on environment depends on the size of the green minority in their constituency.
To this purpose, we use data from List and Sturm (2006) on state-level membership in the three largest environmental organizations (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club). We then interact the dummy Senate3 it with the variable Membership in Green Organizations j and its square term.
The results are reported in Table 9 . In line with Prediction 3 of our model, the coefficient for the linear interaction term is positive and significant, while the coefficient for the square term is negative and significant. The test at the bottom of the table indicates that Senate3 it and the two interaction terms are jointly significant at 1%.
[ Table 9 about here] We have verified that the heterogeneous effect of election proximity across constituencies are not driven by senators who switched party. As it can be seen from Tables C-9 and C-10, even when dropping these senators, we find that the size of the single-issue minority has a clear non-monotonic effect on the probability that Democrats become more 27 Bouton, Laurent, Paola Conconi, Francisco Pino, and Maurizio Zanardi, "The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion," Review of Economics and Statistics (2020) . Advance publication. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00897 pro gun and Republicans become more pro environment as they approach re-election.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that minorities of single-issue voters can shape politicians' choices on the issues that are salient to them. The key idea is that, when it comes to secondary issues like gun control, environment and reproductive rights, office-motivated politicians are only accountable to minorities of voters who care intensely about these issues, knowing that the rest of the electorate will decide whether or not to re-elect them based on their stance on other policy issues.
To capture this idea, we have described a simple model in which office and policy To assess the validity of these predictions, we have studied the voting behavior of U.S. senators on legislation related to gun control, environment, and reproductive rights.
The staggered structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and one third is up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of different generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
We obtain three main results. First, as they approach re-election, Democratic senators are more likely to vote pro gun, while Republican senators are more likely to vote in favor of environmental regulations. As expected, election proximity has no effect on senators' voting behavior on reproductive rights. Second, Democratic (Republican) senators flip flop on gun control (environment), but only if they are seeking re-election (i.e. not retiring). Finally, we find evidence of heterogeneous effects across states: election proximity only affects the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when the pro-gun (pro-environment) group in their constituency is neither too small nor too large. Our results are robust to including a rich set of controls for legislators and their constituencies, and exploiting variation both across and within senators.
These findings highlight that politicians systematically respond to the interests of different single-issue voters on different secondary policy issues. The influence of these voters across several issues gives credence to the argument that multidimensionality of the policy space does not necessarily impair electoral accountability. Because single-issue voters see the policy space as unidimensional, they can use voting to punish and reward 
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